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DE SE KNOWLEDGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OMNISCIENT BEING 
Stephan Torre 
 
In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the 
claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient 
being.  I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is 
possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a 
claim involving de se knowledge.  I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed 
by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and argue that this 
response is unsuccessful.  I then consider David Lewis‟s theory of de se attitudes 
involving the self-ascription of properties.  I claim that, according to this theory, 
there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing 
(F).  I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se 
knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. 
 
Consider the following case:
1
  I am at a pool party and around the pool are several burning 
torches.  At some point, I smell the distinct smell of burning hair and I come to know that 
someone‟s hair is on fire.  I then see a reflection in the water of an individual whose hair is on 
fire and I come to know of this individual that his hair is on fire.  Next I realize that everyone is 
pointing and shouting at me. I suddenly realize: 
(F) My hair is on fire!  
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When I come to realize (F), my behavior changes drastically; I jump into the pool in order to 
extinguish the flames.  The fact that my behavior changes drastically when I go from knowing 
that someone‟s hair is on fire (or knowing de re of some person that his hair is on fire) to 
knowing that my hair is on fire suggests that a change in knowledge has occurred.  What I know 
in knowing (F) is not the de dicto knowledge that someone‟s hair is on fire or the de re 
knowledge of some person that his hair is on fire, since I knew each of these things without 
jumping into the pool.  It isn‟t even the de dicto knowledge that Stephan‟s hair is on fire since I 
could know that without jumping into the pool (perhaps if I had so much to drink that I no longer 
knew that I was Stephan).  Examples such as this one suggest that there is a type of knowledge 
that is neither de re nor de dicto knowledge.  This type of knowledge has been termed „de se‟ 
knowledge.  
 
I. De Se Knowledge and Omniscience 
The existence of de se knowledge poses a prima facie difficulty for the possibility of an 
omniscient being, and more generally, for the possibility that some other individual can know 
what I know when I come to have de se knowledge.  Patrick Grim presents the difficulty that de 
se knowledge raises for omniscience as follows:  
In order to qualify as omniscient or all-knowing, a being must know at least all 
that is known.  Such a being must, then, know what I know in knowing 
[(F)]…But what I know in such a case, it appears, is known by no omniscient 
being.  The indexical „I‟… is essential to what I know in knowing [(F)].  But only 
I can use that „I‟ to index me—no being distinct from me can do so.  I am not 
omniscient.  But there is something that I know that no being distinct from me can 
know.  Neither I nor any being distinct from me, then, is omniscient: there is no 
omniscient being.
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Grim‟s argument can be restated as follows: 
 (1) I come to know something, namely (F), when I realize that my hair is on fire. 
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 (2) No one else can know what I know in knowing (F). 
 (3) I am not omniscient. 
(4) If I know something that no one else can know and I am not omniscient then no being 
is omniscient. 
 (5) Therefore, no being is omniscient. 
Given the validity of Grim‟s argument, the defender of the possibility of an omniscient being 
must reject one of the premises.  The „hair-on-fire‟ example above and others like it successfully 
demonstrate that premise (1) is true: there is something I come to know when I realize that my 
hair is on fire.
3
  Premise (3) is obvious enough.  Premise (4) follows from the definition of 
omniscience and logic.  The only premise that seems up for dispute is premise (2).
4
  In this 
paper, I will explore whether it is possible for some individual distinct from myself to know what 
I know in knowing (F).  I will consider two accounts of de se knowledge, one involving first-
person propositions and another involving properties.  I will conclude that a theory of first-
person propositions that allows for the falsity of premise (2) has unacceptable consequences.  I 
will claim that on the properties account, there are two senses in which someone else can know 
what I know in knowing (F): the first sense does not offer much hope for the possibility of an 
omniscient being, but the second one does. 
   
II. The First-Person Propositions Account 
One way of undermining premise (2) is to claim that de se knowledge is in fact reducible to de 
dicto knowledge and that this de dicto knowledge is knowable by beings distinct from me.  Such 
an approach is adopted by Edward Wierenga in The Nature of God.
5
  Wierenga takes as his 
starting point Roderick Chishom‟s account of de se knowledge as presented in Person and 
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Object.
6
  Chisholm introduces a special notion of entailment (I will follow Wierenga in referring 
to this special sense as „entailc‟) according to which a proposition p entailsc the property of being 
Q just in case p is necessarily such that (i) if it obtains then something has the property of being 
Q and (ii) whoever accepts p believes that something is Q.
7
  Chisholm claims that in using a 
sentence involving a first-person pronoun, an individual grasps a first-person proposition.  A 
first-person proposition is one that entailsc the individual‟s individual essence or haecceity.  
Chisholm provides the following definition for „individual essence‟ or „haecceity‟: 
G is an individual essence (or haecceity) =Df. G is a property which is such that, 
for every x, x has G if and only if x is necessarily such that it has G, and it is 
impossible that there is a y other than x such that y has G.
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On Chisholm‟s proposal, in believing (F) I believe a first-person proposition that entailsc the 
conjunction of my individual essence and the property of having hair that is on fire. 
 Chisholm goes on to state the following “corollary” to his view: “whereas each person knows 
directly and immediately certain propositions implying his own individual essence, no one 
knows any propositions implying the individual essence of anyone else.”9  I will refer to this 
claim in what follows as „Chisholm‟s Corollary‟.10 
 Clearly, Chisholm‟s account of de se knowledge entails the truth of premise (2) of Grim‟s 
argument.  In particular, Chisholm‟s Corollary states that no one but me can grasp propositions 
that entailc my haecceity.  If this is the case, then no one can know what I know in knowing (F) 
since (F) is a first-person proposition that entailsc my haecceity.  Wierenga has argued that we 
can accept Chisholm‟s account of de se knowledge without accepting Chisholm‟s Corollary.  He 
claims that the thesis that only I can know my first-person propositions: 
…is not an essential requirement of the reduction of de se belief to de dicto; it is 
not [as Chisholm claims] a corollary of it. What is crucial to the reduction is that 
it should provide as an object of my de se belief something that I cannot believe 
without believing something about myself; it is immaterial whether someone else 
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can believe it, as long as whoever else believes it does not end up with a belief 
about him or herself.
11
   
 
Wierenga accepts the part of Chisholm‟s account according to which S‟s having a de se belief 
that he himself or she herself is F involves believing a first-person proposition p that entailsc the 
conjunction of S‟s haecceity and the property F.  However, he rejects the claim that p can only be 
known by S.  He provides the following formulation of belief de se: 
(W) A person, S, believes de se that he himself or she herself is F just in case 
there is a haecceity E such that S has E and S believes a proposition entailingc the 
conjunction of E and F.
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It is consistent with (W) that someone else, S, believes the same first-person proposition that I 
believe in believing (F) without S having a de se belief, since the haecceity entailedc by the first-
person proposition is mine, not S‟s.  This allows Wierenga to reject premise (2) of Grim‟s 
argument since someone else can know what I know in knowing (F).   
 It is true that if the proponent of first-person propositions rejects Chisholm‟s Corollary, 
he thereby avoids Grim‟s objection to omniscience.  However, in rejecting the Corollary he also 
introduces substantial difficulties for his theory.  Recall that one of the main reasons for positing 
de se belief in the first place was to explain differences in behavior.  It is only when I realize that 
my hair is on fire that I jump into the pool.  If we reject Chisholm‟s Corollary, we lose the ability 
to explain differences in behavior in terms of differences in content.
13
  According to the view 
under consideration, when I know (F) I know some first-person proposition that entailsc the 
conjunction of my haecceity and the property of having hair that is on fire.  Suppose that 
someone else at the party, Susan, is also able to grasp this first-person proposition.  She will 
grasp a proposition that entailsc my haecceity and the property of having hair that is on fire.  
Knowing this proposition will not lead her to jump in the pool.  The content of her knowledge 
will be the same as the content of my knowledge, but her behavior will be different from my 
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behavior.
14
  Therefore, rejecting Chisholm‟s Corollary means rejecting the plausible supposition 
that differences in behavior are explainable in terms of differences in content. 
 Secondly, an example from David Lewis shows that (W) is an unacceptable reduction of 
de se knowledge to de dicto knowledge.  Lewis writes: 
Consider the case of two gods.  They inhabit a certain possible world, and they 
know exactly which world it is.  Therefore they know every proposition that is 
true at their world.  Insofar as knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are 
omniscient.  Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows 
which of the two he is.  They are not exactly alike.  One lives on top of the tallest 
mountain and throws down manna; the other lives on top of the coldest mountain 
and throws down thunderbolts.  Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest 
mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna or 
thunderbolts.
15
 
 
Since both gods know every proposition, they both know every first-person proposition.  Let us 
refer to the haecceity of the god on the tallest mountain as „H‟.  Call the proposition that entailsc 
the conjunction of H and the property of being on the tallest mountain „p‟.  Both gods know p.  
By (W), the god on the tallest mountain‟s knowledge of p is de se knowledge, whereas the god 
on the coldest mountain‟s knowledge of p is not de se, since p entailsc the former god‟s haecceity 
and not the latter‟s.  But even though the god on the tallest mountain‟s knowledge of p amounts 
to de se knowledge according to (W), he still doesn‟t know where he is by knowing only 
propositions.  In order to know where he is, he would have to know that H is his haecceity.   The 
fact that (W) entails that the god has de se knowledge, even though he still doesn‟t know where 
he is, demonstrates that the proposed reduction of de se to de dicto fails.
16
 
 Although rejecting Chisholm‟s Corollary does allow the proponent of first-person 
propositions to reject premise (2) of Grim‟s argument, it introduces new difficulties for the 
theory.  First, it requires one to abandon the supposition that differences in behavior are 
explainable in terms of differences in content.  Secondly, if others are permitted to grasp my 
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first-person propositions, the additional difficulty arises as to how I can know that my first-
person propositions are mine rather than someone else‟s.17  Knowing this seems to require 
knowing what my haecceity is, and this is knowledge that cannot be given in terms of 
propositions, first-person or otherwise. 
 
III. The Properties Account 
David Lewis provides an alternative theory of de se knowledge according to which the objects of 
de se attitudes are properties.
18
  In what follows I will discuss what implications this theory has 
for premise (2) of Grim‟s argument.  I will argue that, given Lewis‟ theory, there are two 
different senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F).  Although both 
senses are sufficient for the rejection of premise (2) of Grim‟s argument, the proponent of the 
possibility of an omniscient God should claim that God is capable of knowing what I know in 
knowing (F) in the second sense. 
Lewis takes the objects of de se beliefs to be properties.  He claims that while 
propositions are sufficient for characterizing the content of the beliefs one might have about what 
kind of world one inhabits, they fail to characterize the content of the beliefs one might have 
about who or where one is within a world.  In order to characterize the content of beliefs 
concerning who or where one is within a world, we must adopt properties rather than 
propositions as the objects of belief.  To have a de se belief is to self-ascribe a property.  For 
example, in believing (F) I self-ascribe the property of having hair that is on fire (I will refer to 
this property henceforth as „F*‟).   
 Given this account of knowledge de se, is it true that no one can know what I know in 
knowing (F)?  Lewis considers a case in which two individuals have the same belief.  Madman 
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Heimson believes himself to be Hume.  Hume also believes himself to be Hume.  There seems to 
be a sense in which Hume and Heimson believe the same thing; however what Heimson believes 
is false and what Hume believes is true.  Lewis states, “There are two ways out. (1) Heimson 
does not, after all, believe what Hume did.  Or (2) Heimson does believe what Hume did, but 
Heimson believes falsely what Hume believes truly.”19  In defense of the second way out, Lewis 
states, “But there had better also be a central and important sense in which Heimson and Hume 
believe alike.  For one thing, the predicate „believes he is Hume‟ applies to both.”20  Lewis 
concludes, “If we can agree that beliefs are in the head, so that Heimson and Hume may indeed 
believe alike, then the first way out is shut.  We must take the second.  Heimson‟s belief and 
Hume‟s have the same object.”21  Heimson and Hume both have the same property as the object 
of their belief; they both self-ascribe the property of being Hume. 
The example involving Heimson and Hume suggests a way in which someone else can 
know what I know in knowing (F).  If the object of someone else‟s de se knowledge is the same 
as the object of my de se knowledge in knowing (F) then she counts as knowing what I know in 
knowing (F).  This claim can be stated as follows (where „F*‟ denotes the property of having hair 
that is on fire): 
(L1) Someone else, S, knows what I know in knowing (F) if i) I know that I 
myself have F* and ii) S knows that she herself has F*.
22
 
  
In knowing (F), I self-ascribe the property F*.  Suppose there is someone at the party, Susan, 
who is out of sight from me and her hair also catches on fire.  Suppose that Susan comes to know 
(F).  In doing so, Susan self-ascribes F*.  Susan has the same property as the object of her de se 
knowledge as I do, and, according to (L1), she knows what I know in knowing (F). 
 Is (L1) satisfactory as an account of what it is for someone else to know what I know in 
knowing (F)?  Does Susan know what I know?  I think there is a sense in which she does and a 
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sense in which she does not.  She does know what I know in that she has the same object of 
knowledge as I do; we both have F* as the object of our knowledge.  Similarly, sameness of 
object of knowledge explains sameness of behavior; we both take ourselves to have the property 
of having hair that is on fire and we will both try to extinguish our hair.  But there is another 
sense in which Susan doesn‟t know what I know.  After all, I know that my hair is on fire and 
Susan knows that her hair is on fire.  Susan, being out of sight, is completely ignorant of the fact 
that my hair is on fire.  This suggests that although there is a clear sense in which Susan does 
know what I know, there is another sense in which she does not.   
 Susan‟s ignorance suggests that there is another sense in which someone distinct from me 
knows what I know in knowing (F).  Lewis considers the analogous case of belief: 
Suppose Heimson manages to convince his psychiatrist that he is right, so the 
psychiatrist also ascribes to Heimson the property of being Hume.  Then Heimson 
and his psychiatrist share a common belief.  Not in the sense in which Heimson 
and Hume do—the psychiatrist doesn‟t believe that he himself is Hume—but in 
another, equally legitimate sense.
23
 
 
Suppose that Sam is at the party and he sees my hair catch on fire.  Just as there is a sense in 
which Heimson‟s psychologist believes what Heimson believes in believing that he is Hume, 
there is a sense in which Sam knows what I know in knowing (F).  Sam ascribes to me the same 
property that I ascribe to myself.  In order for knowledge of this type of ascription to be possible, 
it must be possible to ascribe properties to other individuals.  The ascription of properties to 
individuals involves belief de re and on Lewis‟s account de re belief is also understood in terms 
of the self-ascription of properties: For S to ascribe a property, X, to an individual Y, he i) self-
ascribes the property of standing in a suitable relation of acquaintance, A, uniquely to something 
that has the property X and ii) S stands in A to Y.
24
  Given this account of what it is to ascribe 
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properties to an individual, we can formulate a second sense in which someone can know what I 
know in knowing (F): 
(L2) Someone else, S, knows what I know in knowing (F) if i) I know that I 
myself have F* and ii) S knows that he himself has the property of standing in a 
suitable relation of acquaintance, A, uniquely to something that has F* and iii) S 
stands in A to me. 
 
Sam knows what I know in knowing (F) in the sense given by (L2) since he knows that he has 
the property of standing in a suitable relation of acquaintance to something (and nothing else) 
that has F* and Sam does, in fact, stand in that relation to me. 
 Note that according to the sense of „knowing what I know‟ given in (L2), having the 
same knowledge as me does not require having the same object of de se knowledge as me.  The 
object of my de se knowledge is F*; whereas the object of Sam‟s de se knowledge is the property 
of bearing a relation of acquaintance uniquely to an individual that has F*.  This time the 
difference in our respective objects of knowledge explains the differences in our behavior (I 
jump in the pool, Sam runs over to help).    
 I have claimed that, given Lewis‟s theory, there are two distinct senses in which someone 
else can be said to know what I know in knowing (F).  It might be objected that (L1) and (L2) 
both fail to give a proper account of what it is for someone else to know what I know in knowing 
(F).  After all, as argued above, Susan can have the same object of knowledge as me without 
knowing that my hair is on fire.  So there seems to be a sense in which Susan does not know what 
I know in knowing (F).  Similarly, Sam can ascribe the same property to me that I ascribe to 
myself, but in doing so, the object of his knowledge is not the same as the object of my 
knowledge.  So there is a sense in which Sam does not know what I know in knowing (F) since 
the object of our knowledge differs.  One might argue that to truly count as knowing what I 
  
11 
11 
know in knowing (F), someone else must (i) have the same property as me as the object of one‟s 
knowledge and (ii) must ascribe that property to me.   
However, it is a consequence of the properties account that it is logically impossible for 
someone distinct from me to satisfy both (i) and (ii).  This can be seen by noting that on this 
theory, de se knowledge is a special case of de re knowledge; de se knowledge involves the 
ascription of a property to an object (viz. oneself).  Lewis states, “Self-ascription of properties is 
ascription of properties to oneself under the relation of identity.  Certainly, identity is a relation 
of acquaintance par excellence.  So belief de se falls under belief de re.”25  When I know (F), I 
ascribe F* to myself under the relation of identity.  No one else can do that for the mundane 
reason that no one else is identical to me.  Someone distinct from me can either ascribe F* to me 
under some non-identity acquaintance relation, by having some property other than F* as the 
object of his knowledge (such as in the case of Sam) or one can have F* as the object of her 
knowledge without ascribing F* to me (such as in the case of Susan). What is impossible, on the 
properties account, is for anyone distinct from me to have F* as the object of her knowledge, 
while, at the same time, ascribing it to me.  
 
IV. The Properties Account and the Possibility of Omniscience 
Let us now return to Grim‟s argument against omniscience.  I have claimed that on Lewis‟s 
theory there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F), so 
adopting Lewis‟s theory allows one to reject premise (2).  Grim recognizes that Lewis‟s theory 
allows for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), however he claims that the sense 
in which the theory, “might seem to offer an escape for omniscience from indexical difficulties,” 
in fact, “leaves omniscience in worse shape than ever before.”26  He claims, “In order for God to 
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know what I know, on Lewis‟ account, he must self-attribute truly the properties of making a 
mess and making mistakes.  But God cannot self-attribute such properties truly, for God makes 
neither messes nor mistakes.  God does not, then, know what I know.  God is not omniscient.”27  
The sense of „knowing what I know‟ that Grim adopts in this passage is clearly the sense given 
by (L1).  Grim presupposes that in order for God to know what I know in knowing (F), God, like 
Susan, must truly self-ascribe F*.  Truly self-ascribing various properties like having hair that is 
on fire, or making a mess, Grim argues, would run contrary to God‟s nature.28  However, the 
proponent of the possibility of an omniscient being should not claim that God knows what I 
know in knowing (F) in the sense given by (L1).  After all, recall that Susan can know what I 
know in the sense of (L1) while being completely ignorant of the fact that my hair is on fire.  
Similarly, God might know everything that I know in the sense of (L1) without knowing any of 
the properties that I have.  I agree with Grim that if the proponent of the possibility of 
omniscience claims that God knows what I know in the sense given by (L1) then omniscience is 
in worse shape than before.  However, I think the proponent of the possibility of omniscience 
would be foolish to claim that God knows what I know in knowing (F) in the sense of (L1).  
Instead she should claim that God knows what I know in knowing (F) in the sense given by (L2): 
God knows what I know in virtue of being able to truly ascribe to me all those properties that I 
know myself to have.   
It might be objected that even though God knows what I know in knowing (F) in the 
sense given by (L2), there is still a sense in which God does not know what I know in knowing 
(F), since God does not have the same object of de se knowledge as me.  God fails to know what 
I know in the (L1) sense.  An objector might argue that God‟s lack of knowledge in this sense is 
sufficient for denying his omniscience.  However, as noted above, given the properties account, 
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it is logically impossible for a being distinct from me to know what I know in both the (L1) and 
the (L2) sense.  Therefore, knowing what I know in both of these senses cannot be a requirement 
for omniscience.  Since the (L2) sense is the sense of „knowing what I know‟ that is relevant to 
omniscience, only this sense is necessary for omniscience.  The defender of Grim‟s argument 
had better not demand that God truly ascribes F* to me under the same relation that I ascribe F* 
to myself, because I ascribe F* to myself under the relation of identity, and not even God is 
capable of doing that.
29
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1 The example I present is a variation on David Kaplan‟s „pants-on-fire‟ example in David Kaplan, 
"Demonstratives," in Almog, Perry, and Wettstein, eds.,  Themes From Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), pp. 481-563.  Other examples involving de se beliefs may be found in John Perry, “The Problem of the 
Essential Indexical,” Noûs 13 (1979): 3-21 and in Hector-Neri Castañeda, "‟He‟: A Study in the Logic of Self-
Consciousness,” Ratio 8 (1966): 130-157. 
2 In Patrick Grim, “Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals,” Noûs 19 (1985): 151-180.  Grim 
uses Perry‟s „messy shopper‟ example to motivate his argument.  In the original quote he refers not to (F) but to the 
claim: I am making a mess.  A similar argument is given by Norman Kretzmann in “Omniscience and 
Immutability,” Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 409-421. 
3 I am assuming here that when I go from knowing de re of Stephan that his hair is on fire to knowing de se that my 
hair is on fire, there is something new that I come to know; the content of my knowledge changes.  This overlooks 
the account presented by Perry in “The Problem of the Essential Indexical.”  Perry holds that when I go from having 
de re knowledge to having de se knowledge, there is no change in content.  He claims that what I know in both cases 
is a singular proposition consisting of me and the property of having hair that is on fire.  According to Perry, what 
changes in going from the de re case to the de se case is the way in which I believe this singular proposition.  I find 
this account unpersuasive.  It seems clear that in the hair-on-fire example, and others like it, when I go from having 
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de re knowledge to having de se knowledge, there is something that I come to learn; there is a change in what I 
know, not just in how I know something.  This change in what I know seems best characterized in terms of a change 
in the content of my knowledge.    
4 Some disagree.  It has been suggested to me that the defender of the possibility of an omniscient being should deny 
premise (4) of Grim‟s argument.  This would mean denying that an omniscient being must know all that is known.  
On such an account it is possible that I know something that is not known by an omniscient being.  Although 
rejecting premise (4) does avoid Grim‟s conclusion, it means adopting a substantially weakened account of 
omniscience.  An account of omniscience that succeeds in rejecting premise (2) and upholding (4) is, I think, 
preferable to one that rejects (4) and thereby admits that an omniscient being fails to know all that is known. 
5 Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
6 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court, 1976).  Chisholm rejects this account of de se 
belief later in The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).  In this later work, Chisholm 
adopts a property account of de se belief similar to the one I consider below. 
7 Chisholm, p. 28.  
8 Chisholm, p. 29. I follow Chisholm in using „individual essence‟ and „haecceity‟ interchangeably.  I realize this 
overlooks some important issues. 
9 Chisholm, p. 36. 
10 As Wierenga I think correctly points out, „corollary‟ turns out to be a misnomer. 
11 Wierenga, p. 51. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jonathan Kvanvig also raises this point in discussing Chisholm‟s theory in The Possibility of an All-Knowing God 
(New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1986), p. 65. 
14 One might object that even though Susan and I both have the same first-person proposition as the content of our 
knowledge, there are differences in our other beliefs that account for our differences in behavior.  In response we 
can suppose that Susan and I are alike with respect to our entire system of beliefs.  It will still be the case that we 
will behave differently. 
15 David Lewis, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986) pp. 133-156. 
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16 Wierenga (pp. 54-56) considers Lewis‟s example.  When Lewis discusses the example of the gods as an objection 
to a haecceitist account of de se, he claims that the god on the tallest mountain knows the proposition expressed by 
his utterance „I am on the tallest mountain‟ without knowing that he himself is on the tallest mountain.  Wierenga 
takes Lewis to be making the point that the god doesn‟t know the utterance is his utterance.  Wierenga points out, 
correctly I think, that this knowledge not necessary for knowledge de se.  I take Lewis to be making a different 
point.  The god doesn‟t know that the proposition expressed by the utterance is his proposition (that it entails his 
essence) even though, according to (W), his knowledge of the proposition counts as de se knowledge.  
17 Note that both of these difficulties never arise if the proponent of first-person propositions keeps Chisholm‟s 
Corollary.  However, the trouble with Chisholm‟s Corollary is that it lacks independent motivation: why can‟t 
someone distinct from me know the same first-person propositions as me?  Perhaps it is exactly this lack of 
independent motivation that leads Wierenga to jettison it. 
18 Lewis (1986).  A similar account is presented in Chisholm (1981). 
19 Lewis, p. 142. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lewis, p. 143. 
22 As noted above, Lewis takes de se belief to involve the self-ascription of a property.  For me to believe that my 
hair is on fire is to self-ascribe the property of having hair that is on fire.  For me to know that my hair is on fire, it 
cannot be the case that I merely self-ascribe F* since self-ascription is not sufficient for knowledge.  I take the 
locution „S knows that she herself has property P‟ to express the knowledge analogue of „S self-ascribes property P‟ 
for the belief case.  
23 Lewis, p. 151. 
24 See Lewis, pp. 155-57 for what counts as a suitable relation of acquaintance.  In my example I assume that seeing 
counts as such a relation. 
25 Lewis, p. 156. 
26 Grim, p. 171. 
27
 Ibid. 
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28 Grim also points out that the difficulty does not just lie in the fact that God would need to truly self-ascribe 
properties that are contrary to his nature.  If knowing what I know in the sense of (L1) were required for 
omniscience, God would also have to truly ascribe contradictory properties to himself.  See Grim, p. 172. 
29 I would like to thank Lynne Baker, Phil Bricker, Chris Heathwood, Joshua Spencer, Brandt Van der Gaast, the 
audience at the 3rd Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference at University of Rochester and two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments on this paper. 
